Russia Threat Destabilizes US Governance
New START Expiration Raises US Costs
The Congressional Research Service reported that the New START Treaty expired on February 5, 2026, with no successor agreement in place, marking the first time in decades the US lacks a bilateral nuclear arms control treaty with Russia. The Congressional Research Service also documented earlier withdrawals from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, and the Open Skies Treaty in 2020. Historically, treaties like New START provided a framework for bipartisan consensus, passing the Senate with a decisive bipartisan vote, the Congressional Research Service observed. However, the reclassification of Russia as a primary threat has frayed this political unity, leading to growing skepticism toward arms control within Congress, the Congressional Research Service found. To compensate for the loss of verifiable constraints, US governance is shifting toward modern strategic agility, prioritizing unilateral capabilities that use commercial innovation, such as artificial intelligence and resilient space architectures, to build deterrence without strict dependence on Russian participation in treaties, the Congressional Research Service explained. This agility, however, comes at a cost. Without the transparency of data exchanges and on-site inspections, the US must make expensive worst-case assumptions about Russian military modernization, the Congressional Research Service pointed out. The Congressional Research Service further noted that this strategic pivot contributes to fiscal strain, as the financial burden of sustaining a high-threat posture is exacerbated by the national debt.
A 2025 Stimson Center survey of foreign policy elites across 26 allied countries found that 59% of European respondents view Russia as a near-term threat. The Stimson Center's findings also showed that despite this perception, 79% of allied elites prioritize capabilities for independent territorial defense or in-region conflict, with only 5% favoring out-of-area contributions to American operations. This indicates that allies largely expect the United States to shoulder most of the combat burden even as strategic predictability declines.
Iran War Powers Resolution Limits Executive Action
"The passage of the Iran War Powers Resolution on June 23, 2026, shows Congress's capacity to enforce consequences for executive military decisions by directing the cessation of hostilities even without the President's signature," Representative Gregory Meeks stated. A University of Chicago Legal Forum paper argued that the existential framing of Russia does not causally insulate the executive from traditional oversight; instead, it heightens the necessity of inter-branch cooperation for enduring domestic accountability and institutional stability. The paper further explained that while policymakers' desire for international influence can pressure executive branch lawyers to advance expansive claims of presidential authority, the Truman-era model of claiming broad inherent authority without congressional approval is now viewed as politically risky in major power conflicts. The University of Chicago Legal Forum paper also determined that the existential nature of the Russian threat means unilateral executive action lacks the durability required for sustained deterrence, making statutory authorization a legally and politically preferable approach. Domestic political accountability, the paper noted, is operationalized through the enforcement of statutory war powers and public-elite skepticism toward unilateral executive action. Americans have grown increasingly skeptical of broad war powers claims since the Vietnam War, a sentiment amplified by dissatisfaction with prolonged campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the University of Chicago Legal Forum paper reported. This skepticism ensures that citizens and Congress can enforce consequences for executive foreign policy decisions, making unilateral action a riskier political proposition, the University of Chicago Legal Forum paper concluded. The University of Chicago Legal Forum paper observed that no specific statutory amendments, Government Accountability Office reports, or presidential directives enacted between 2014 and 2026 explicitly altered the legal threshold for executive war powers solely in response to Russia's threat reclassification. Instead, according to US Code, the period featured statutory repeals, such as the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolutions in December 2025, which altered the general statutory basis for presidential force but not specifically for Russia.
2016 Election Interference Raises Arms Control Costs
The Council on Foreign Relations, the Texas National Security Review, and the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney reported that the 2016 election interference, characterized by hacking and social media campaigns, served as a critical inflection point. This interference, they documented, stoked electoral divisions and exposed American vulnerability to foreign exploitation of its domestic processes. The United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney found that Russia’s sustained information operations have directly targeted and exploited deep political and social rifts within the United States, making these internal divisions attractive targets for Moscow. This ongoing meddling has tangible consequences for domestic political accountability. For instance, the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that the domestic political costs of negotiating arms control extensions have risen significantly due to public perceptions of Russian treaty violations and election interference. However, Russia’s actions are not the sole cause of the degradation of trust in electoral and institutional mechanisms. The University of Chicago Legal Forum paper stated that Americans have grown increasingly skeptical of broad claims of presidential war powers since the Vietnam War, a trend amplified by public dissatisfaction over decades-long military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. This pre-existing skepticism means that while Russia's exploitation of internal divisions complicates the traditional feedback loop for enforcing accountability, it operates within a broader context of institutional distrust, the University of Chicago Legal Forum paper observed. Consequently, the University of Chicago Legal Forum paper concluded that the executive branch’s historically permissive understanding of constitutional war powers is becoming more constraining in the context of major power conflict, as expansive foreign policy claims are viewed as politically risky.
Russia Threat Reclassification Locks US in Gridlock
Sustained defense appropriations, coupled with the erosion of arms control, demand a re-evaluation of fiscal priorities to balance security needs with national debt management. The reclassification of Russia as an existential threat has locked the United States into a cycle of fiscal strain and institutional gridlock. The ongoing tension between elevated defense spending and the capacity for revenue expansion or entitlement reform will continue to test whether statutory debt-ceiling mechanisms and automatic stabilizers can preserve functional governance, or if recurrent budget brinkmanship will chronically erode domestic political accountability.
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