US Transactionalism Fragments European Defense
Eastern Europe's High Spending, Western Priorities
Eastern flank states are rapidly increasing investment, with Lithuania targeting 5.38% of GDP, Estonia 5.1%, and Latvia 4.9% for 2026, reflecting a clear prioritization of high-end deterrence against Russia, according to the German Council on Foreign Relations. The German Council on Foreign Relations found that Western and Southern European countries focus on regional instability and migration, leading to fragmented defense priorities. The U.S. Department of State reported that a 2025 survey found "59% of European foreign policy elites view Russia as a near-term threat, yet 79% prioritize capabilities for independent territorial defense over contributions to American operations." On September 9, 2025, Russia launched nearly two dozen drones into eastern Poland, followed by unexplained drone sightings over European airports and military facilities. Statista reported that Poland recorded the highest share of GDP dedicated to defense among NATO members in 2024 at 4.12%. The German Council on Foreign Relations added that Germany pledged to meet NATO's 3.5% defense spending target by 2029, using a €100 billion fund exempt from the constitutional debt brake. The German Council on Foreign Relations observed, however, that divergent threat perceptions across the continent create asymmetric capability gaps.
EU Initiatives Face Article 346 TFEU
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe explained that EU primary law, specifically Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), protects national autonomy in essential security matters, complicating joint procurement efforts. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe detailed how industrial fragmentation further undermines a unified deterrent, despite EU initiatives such as the €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) facility and the Readiness 2030 plan, which calls for at least 40% of defense procurement to be conducted jointly. According to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, national security exemptions and unanimity requirements maintain industrial silos. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe observed that European defense budgets remain heavily weighted toward personnel costs, constraining investment in essential warfighting enablers like air power, reserves, and sustainment logistics. The Belfer Center found that, consequently, European militaries still struggle to conduct high-end operations without significant US assistance. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe warned that when American support wanes, these structural weaknesses delay unified response mechanisms, as NATO's slow, consensus-based decision-making allows Russia to exploit the time required for political agreement. The Belfer Center also points out that the EU uses the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, a mechanism for deeper defense cooperation, and the European Defence Fund (EDF), which supports collaborative defense research and development. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe reported that the European Defence Industry through Joint Procurement (EDIRPA) instrument, with a €300 million budget until the end of 2025, promotes cross-border cooperation. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe further explained that the Regulation on the Promotion of Ammunition Production (ASAP) mobilized €500 million to expand ammunition and missile production.
Moscow Exploits Eastern-Western Threat Divide
The German Council on Foreign Relations observed that Eastern flank nations view Russia as an immediate danger, rapidly increasing defense spending. While the 2022 invasion initially boosted cohesion, signs of erosion appeared two years into the war, showing how the strategic divergence between Eastern European existential threat perception and Western/Southern economic prioritization functions as a predictable political fracture line that Moscow can exploit. The Royal United Services Institute and the German Council on Foreign Relations indicate that Western and Southern European countries, in contrast, maintain a less acute threat perception, prioritizing Mediterranean instability, migration, and economic insecurity. Dominika Kunertova and Olivier Schmitt, writing in International Politics, argue that this split directly undermines NATO's long-term stability by exploiting the alliance's slow, consensus-based decision-making. According to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow's strategy relies on fracturing the alliance through gray zone tactics, such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and weaponized migration, to undermine democratic institutions and disrupt cohesion before a conventional response can be coordinated. The NATO Science and Technology Organization, along with Kunertova and Schmitt, noted that while the 2022 invasion initially boosted cohesion, signs of erosion appeared two years into the war; surprisingly, higher tensions with Russia decrease NATO cohesion due to these divergent threat perceptions. Kunertova and Schmitt observed that domestic political shifts, including pro-Moscow electoral victories in Slovakia in September 2023 and opposition from Hungary and Turkey, further solidify this fracture line.
Russia's Drones, Migration, Sabotage Target Article 5
The German Institute for International and Security Affairs, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe have documented Russia's use of gray-zone coercion tactics that successfully exploit the divergence in European threat perceptions. These tactics include drone incursions into Polish and Estonian airspace, suspected sabotage of undersea cables, weaponized migration through Belarus, disinformation campaigns, and the use of chemical weapons. According to the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, these tactics aim to create a fait accompli before NATO can reach political consensus on whether to invoke Article 5, the collective defense clause. This strategy exploits hesitation among member states to consolidate control and peel off vulnerable states.
September 2025 Poland Drone Attack Shows Disunity
The September 2025 drone attack in Poland demonstrated the continent's vulnerability to exploitation of its internal political and threat perception divides. The US perception of Russia as a minor threat compels Europe toward self-reliance, yet this push is undermined by existing industrial fragmentation and divergent national priorities. This creates a security environment where Europe's capacity for unified, rapid response to Russian gray-zone tactics or conventional incursions is compromised.
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